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Abstract
We develop a tractable model of neighborhood choice in a dynamic setting
along with a computationally straightforward estimation approach. This ap-
proach uses information about neighborhood choices and the timing of moves
to recover moving costs and preferences for dynamically-evolving housing and
neighborhood attributes. The model and estimator are potentially applicable to
the study of a wide range of dynamic phenomena in housing markets and cities.
We focus here on estimating the marginal willingness to pay for non-marketed
amenities – neighborhood racial composition, air pollution, and violent crime
– using rich dynamic data. Consistent with the time-series properties of each
amenity, we ﬁnd that a static demand model understates willingness to pay to
avoid pollution and crime but overstates willingness to pay to live near neigh-
bors of one’s own race. These ﬁndings have important implications for the class
of static housing demand models typically used to value urban amenities.
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Dynamic Discrete Choice
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1 Introduction
Models of residential sorting1 and hedonic equilibrium2 have been the focus of long
and active literatures in economics. Many well-known theoretical analyses have com-
bined models of individual location decisions with a market-clearing condition to
characterize equilibrium housing prices, household sorting, and public goods provi-
sion in an urban setting. Empirical analyses of these models have also been used
widely, providing estimates of willingness to pay for a variety of non-marketed local
goods (e.g., education, crime, and environmental amenities), estimates of how such
amenities are capitalized into local house prices, and also to simulate the impact of
policy changes on residential sorting and household welfare.3
Despite making progress in many important dimensions, nearly all the models
estimated to date in these literatures have adopted a static approach. This has raised
a concern – shared by critics and practitioners alike4 – that the empirical ﬁndings
from estimating static models might be subject to serious biases due to the inherently
dynamic nature of household location decisions.5
That location decisions are dynamic follows from a number of key features of
the housing market: (i) large transactions costs that make moves relatively rare,
(ii) changing household tastes and needs over the life-cycle, and (iii) evolving local
amenities and housing prices that give neighborhoods a dynamic character. Yet
estimating truly dynamic models of the location decision is di cult for two primary
1Theoretical contributions to this literature include papers by Ellickson (1971), Epple, Filimon,
and Romer (1984), Epple and Romer (1991), Epple and Romano (1998), and Nechyba (1999, 2000).
Empirical contributions include Epple and Sieg (1999), Ferreyra (2007), Bayer, Ferreira, and McMil-
lan (2007), and Kumino  (2008).
2See Rosen (1974), Epple (1987), Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), Bajari and Kahn
(2005), Kumino  and Jarrah (2010), Bishop and Timmins (2010) and the papers discussed therein.
3See, for example, Sieg, Smith, Banzhaf, and Walsh (2004), Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006),
and Walsh (2007).
4The dynamic nature of location decisions is often acknowledged by the literature and has, for
instance, prompted a long-standing debate as to whether all households or just recent movers should
be used when estimating preferences for amenities. See the discussion in Kahn (1995), Cragg and
Kahn (1997), or Bayer, Keohane, and Timmins (2009).
5For example, if households know in a dynamic context that an amenity mean-reverts over time,
then a static model is likely to understate household valuations of that amenity, as we discuss below.
2reasons. First, estimation of sorting models generally requires the matching of a large
sample of households along with their characteristics to the features and location of
their housing choices. Given this need, most papers in the previous literature have
used data from the decennial Census, which provides great detail about large cross-
sections of households but very little information about the dynamics of decision-
making or the evolution of households and neighborhoods.6
The second factor that makes estimating dynamic location choice models di cult
is the high dimensionality of the state space required in order to characterize the
evolution of a system of neighborhoods or cities. Faced with the resulting curse of di-
mensionality, computing a reasonable dynamic model of residential location decisions
that takes account of the heterogeneous and evolving nature of both households and
neighborhoods has proved very challenging. More recently, however, a series of tech-
nical developments in the literature combined with newly available data have made
dynamic estimation in an urban context increasingly feasible.
In this paper, we propose a new method for estimating a dynamic model of de-
mand for houses and neighborhoods. The starting point for our analysis is a unique
data set linking information about buyers and sellers to the universe of housing trans-
actions in the San Francisco metropolitan area over a period of 11 years. In addition
to precise information about housing structure (e.g., square footage, year built, lot
size, transaction price) and house location, a key feature of these data is that they pro-
vide important demographic and economic information about the buyers and sellers
themselves, permitting us to follow households over time when they move house.7
With this data set in hand, we develop a tractable model of neighborhood choice
in a dynamic setting, along with a corresponding estimation approach that is compu-
6Recent papers by Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2010) and Caetano (2010) have made exciting
advances in the estimation of dynamic models by using the limited dynamic information in the
Census in creative ways. By assuming a stationary environment with respect to neighborhood and
population evolutions – assumptions that are very reasonable in the context of the questions they
address – these papers take important steps forward in studying issues related to household dynamics
over the lifecycle.
7Details of the data matching procedure we use are discussed in the next section.
3tationally straightforward. This approach, which combines and extends the insights
of Rust (1987), Berry (1994), and Hotz and Miller (1993), allows both the observed
and unobserved features of each neighborhood to evolve over time in a completely
ﬂexible manner. It makes use of information on neighborhood choices and the tim-
ing of moves to recover: (i) preferences for housing and neighborhood attributes,
(ii) preferences for the performance of housing as a ﬁnancial asset (e.g., expected
appreciation, volatility), and (iii) moving costs.
The model and estimator that we develop build on a number of recent advances
in the industrial organization literature on dynamic demand for durable and storable
goods.8 First, motivated by the fact that housing constitutes two-thirds of the typical
homeowner’s ﬁnancial portfolio, we explicitly model housing as an asset and allow
each household’s wealth to evolve endogenously. Households in our model anticipate
selling their homes at some point in the future and thus explicitly consider the ex-
pected evolution of neighborhood amenities and housing prices when deciding where
and when to purchase or sell their house.
Second, we develop a novel approach for identifying the marginal utility of con-
sumption, which has long been a thorny issue in the literature on demand estimation
in applications in both industrial organization and urban economics. The main chal-
lenge faced by researchers stems from the strong correlation between a product’s price
and its unobserved quality, generally requiring instruments that are correlated with
price but uncorrelated with unobservables. It is fair to say that such instruments are
hard to come by. In our application, we exploit the fact that households face a mon-
etary trade-o  both in the standard sense of deciding which product (neighborhood)
to purchase but also in the decision of when to move. Here, we take advantage of the
fact that realtor fees during our sample period were quite uniform (6 percent of house
value) in order to identify the marginal utility of consumption when estimating each
resident’s move-stay decision.
Thirdly, we relax the index su ciency assumption that has become a common
8See Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2010) for an excellent recent review of this literature.
4feature of the dynamic demand literature. First proposed by Melnikov (2001) and
Hendel and Nevo (2006), this assumption helps to deal with the computational chal-
lenges posed by the large state space typically arising in models of dynamic demand.
Instead of treating the logit inclusive value as a su cient statistic for predicting fu-
ture continuation values, we construct the continuation value from the underlying
values associated with each neighborhood in the subsequent period, letting those
neighborhood values depend on the current state space in a ﬂexible manner.
We estimate a version of the model that allows for household preference hetero-
geneity on the basis of race, income, and wealth. We then use the estimated utility
parameters to value marginal changes in non-marketed amenities. In particular, we
estimate the way that neighborhood racial composition, violent crime, and air pollu-
tion a ect the ﬂow utility derived from a particular residential choice.
The ﬁndings from this exercise indicate that the preference estimates derived from
our dynamic approach di er substantially from estimates derived from a compara-
ble static demand model. For example, the per-year willingness to pay to avoid a
10-percent increase in the number violent crimes per 100,000 population is $586 (in
2000 dollars), which is about seventy percent higher than the $344 recovered from a
comparable static estimation procedure. In the case of air pollution, the correspond-
ing di erences are even larger ($296 from the dynamic model versus $73 from the
static) though still in the same direction. In contrast, the per-year marginal willing-
ness to pay for race (in particular, the preferences of whites for living in proximity
to other whites) is $1,558 whereas the estimate from a naive static model is substan-
tially higher at $1,973. Given the time-series properties of each of these variables, the
sign of the bias from ignoring dynamic considerations accords, in each case, with the
intuition that the valuations of mean-reverting amenities will be understated while
those of positively-persistent amenities will be overstated by a static model.9
9We develop this reasoning more fully in Section 6 below. In the case of a mean-reverting
amenity, for example, a static demand model will incorrectly interpret the justiﬁable downweighting
of a high value of the amenity today by households as a low static valuation, thereby understating
willingness-to-pay for the amenity.
5Beyond the current application, the model and estimation method that we propose
provide a foundation for addressing a wide set of dynamic issues in housing markets
and cities. These include, for instance, the analysis of the microdynamics of residential
segregation and gentriﬁcation within metropolitan areas.10 It is worth noting that
the estimation approach we develop is computationally light, in addition to which the
kinds of transactions data required to estimate the model have become increasingly
available for cities throughout the country in recent years, making further exploration
of these issues very viable.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our data set
and the matching procedure used to construct it. Our model, estimation strategy,
and parameter estimates are presented in Sections 3 through 5, respectively. Section
6 discusses the implications of estimating a static demand model when agents are
actually behaving dynamically; and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
In this section, we describe a new data set that we have assembled, merging infor-
mation about buyers and sellers with the universe of housing transactions in the San
Francisco metropolitan area. We discuss the source data and also demonstrate that
the merge results in a high-quality and representative data set based on multiple
diagnostic tests.
The data set that we construct is drawn from two main sources. The ﬁrst comes
from Dataquick Information Services, a national real estate data company, and pro-
vides information about each housing unit sold in the core counties of the Bay Area
(San Francisco, Marin, San Mateo, Alameda, Contra Costa, and Santa Clara) be-
tween 1994 and 2004. The buyers’ and sellers’ names are provided, along with the
transaction price, exact street address, square footage, year built, lot size, number of
10Recent theoretical research on aspects of the dynamic microfoundations of housing markets by
Ortalo-Magn´ e and Rady (2002, 2006, 2008) and Bajari, Benkard, and Krainer (2005) raise a number
of additional empirical questions that could be addressed using this framework.
6rooms, number of bathrooms, number of units in building, and many other character-
istics.11 A key feature of this transactions data set is that it also includes information
about the buyer’s mortgage (including the loan amount and lender’s name for all
loans). It is this mortgage information which allows us to link the transactions data
to information about buyers (and many sellers).
The source of the economic and demographic information about buyers and sellers
is the data set on mortgage applications published in accordance with the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), which was enacted by Congress in 1975 and is
implemented by the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation C.12 The HMDA data provide
information on the race, income, and gender of the buyer/applicant, as well as the
mortgage loan amount, mortgage lender’s name, and the census tract where the
property is located.
We merge the two data sets on the basis of the following variables: census tract,
loan amount, date, and lender name. Using this procedure, we obtain a unique match
for approximately 70 percent of sales. Because the original transactions data set
includes the full names of buyers and sellers, we are also able to merge demographic
and economic information about sellers into the data set, provided (i) a seller bought
another house within the metropolitan area and (ii) a unique match with HMDA was
obtained for that house. This procedure allows us to merge in information about
sellers for approximately 35-40 percent of our sample.
To ensure that our HMDA/Dataquick matching procedure is valid, we conduct
several diagnostic tests. Using public-access Census micro data from IPUMS, we ﬁrst
calculate the distributions of income and race of those who purchased a house in
1999 in each of the six Bay Area counties. We compare these distributions to the
11By comparison, the list of housing characteristics is considerably more detailed than that avail-
able in Census microdata, for example.
12The purpose of the act is “to provide public loan data that can be used to determine whether
ﬁnancial institutions are serving the housing needs of their communities and whether public o cials
are distributing public-sector investments so as to attract private investment to areas where it
is needed.” Another purpose is to identify any possible discriminatory lending patterns. (See
http://www. ec.gov/hmda for more details.)
7distributions in our merged data set in Table A.1 in the Appendix. As can be seen,
the numbers match almost perfectly in each of the six counties, strongly suggesting
that the matched buyers are representative of all new buyers. Table A.2 provides a
second diagnostic check, concerning the representativeness of the merged data set in
terms of housing characteristics. We report sample statistics for a subset of the house-
level variables taken from the original data set that includes the complete universe
of transactions, as well as sample statistics for the merged data set.13 A comparison
of the two samples suggests that the set of houses for which we have a unique loan
record from HMDA is representative of the universe of houses. Overall, our diagnostic
checks provide strong evidence supporting the validity of our matching procedure.
In addition to merged data on households and the houses they choose, the esti-
mation routine discussed below also requires that we follow households through time
so that we can determine both when they buy and sell a property. Since the data set
provides a complete census of all house sales with a unique code for every property,
it is straightforward to determine if a household moves. And if an individual buys a
house in a given period, we know that he/she will stay there until we see that house
sell again.14
The unit of geography in the model discussed below is a neighborhood, where we
deﬁne neighborhoods by merging nearby census tracts until there are approximately
10,000 housing units in each neighborhood.15 We drop a number of neighborhoods
13We drop outlying observations where reported sales price – reported in 2000 dollars – is above
the 99th or below the 1st percentile of sales prices. We also drop houses with reported values of
lot size, square footage, number of bedrooms, and number of rooms higher (or lower) than their
respective maximum (or minimum) reported in Table A.1.
14More di cult is determining where a household moves conditional on moving. The raw data do
not provide a unique household identiﬁer; however, they do provide the name of both the purchaser
and the seller. We use the name information to create a household identiﬁer by looking for a house
purchase in a window of time around a sale for which the purchaser’s name (in the purchase) matches
the seller’s name (in the sale). If we cannot ﬁnd a new purchase within a year on either side of the
sale, we assume that the household has either left the Bay Area or moved to a rental unit.
15The merging algorithm starts with the least populated census tract, and merges it together with
the nearest tract such that the combined population does not exceed 25,000. The algorithm iterates
until no possible combination of tracts would result in combined populations of less than 25,000. A
population of 25,000 roughly corresponds to 10,000 housing units. The population and geographic
data for each census tract come from the 2000 Census.
8that have less than 6 sales in any year between 1994 and 2004,16 leaving us with 225
neighborhoods in total. The corresponding neighborhood boundaries are shown in
Figure 1, along with the county names.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the merged data that we use for estimation.
We include summary statistics for both household and neighborhood characteristics.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Household Characteristics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Income 263469 133.26 137.22 0 11248.08
Down Payment 263469 119.08 132.37 0 2417.18
Sale Price 263469 448.26 269.40 101.24 2691.45
White 263469 1 0 1 1
Year 263469 1999.11 3.14 1994 2004
Neighborhood Characteristics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Percent White 2475 69.34 16.50 20.12 96.77
Violent Crime 2475 458.62 257.37 46.03 2156.00
Ozone 2475 2.19 2.57 0.002 18.25
Sale Price 2475 428.91 210.74 117.50 1859.31
Note: Income, Down Payment, and Sale Price are measured in $1000’s.
Our household sample consists of over 263 thousand observations. The household-
level characteristics we focus on are income, race, and wealth. The sample mean
household income is around $133,000, with a standard deviation of a similar amount.
As income is only observed when a household makes a purchase, we assume that
income does not change over time. In terms of race, we only use white households
when estimating the model, as discussed below; white households account for around
68 percent of households in the Bay Area. Household wealth is measured as the dif-
ference between the household’s current house value and the initial mortgage amount,
with current house value being deﬁned as sales price in the year the house is sold and
16We drop 28 neighborhoods, equivalent to 11 percent of neighborhoods but only 4 percent of
sales.
9an imputed price in subsequent years. The imputation uses the original house price
and adjusts this according to an appreciation index generated from a repeat sales
analysis, with the appreciation index calculated separately for each neighborhood.
The neighborhood characteristics we use are mean house price, air quality (ground-
level ozone concentrations), violent crime rates, and the racial composition (per-
centage white) of home owners. We control for changing attributes of the houses
that sold when calculating time variation in each neighborhood’s mean price.17 In
terms of air quality, we use annual data from the California Air Resources Board
(www.arb.ca.gov/adam/) that reports readings from thirty seven monitors in the
Bay Area between 1994-2004. While several di erent measures of ground-level ozone
pollution are reported in these data, we use information on the number of days each
year that pollution exceeded the one-hour state standard (i.e., 90 parts per billion)
to construct speciﬁc measures for each neighborhood centroid. In particular, we use
the latitudes and longitudes of all monitors to construct a distance-weighted average
of the number of ‘exceedances’ for each neighborhood.
Ozone is a convenient environmental disamenity to study in this context. Un-
like many other pollutants, geography and weather are largely responsible for cross-
sectional variation in ground-level ozone pollution. San Francisco, Oakland, and San
Jose all face heavy tra c congestion. However, wind patterns mitigate much of the
ozone pollution in San Francisco and Oakland, while worsening it in San Jose; and
mountains ringing the southern end of the Bay Area block air ﬂows and contribute to
this e ect.18 At the same time, fog (which is especially prevalent in San Francisco)
can lower temperatures and block sunlight, preventing the formation of ozone.
In addition to the cross-sectional variation just described, there is also signiﬁcant
17To generate appreciation trends, we use the same repeat sales analysis used to impute individual
house values. We regress log price on year and house dummies and create appreciation measures
from the coe cients on the year dummies: the regressions and associated appreciation measures are
estimated separately for every neighborhood. This procedure is e ectively a simpliﬁcation of the
method described in Case and Shiller (1989). The cross-sectional variation in house prices is driven
by di erences in prices across neighborhoods averaged over all years.
18The mountains on the eastern side of the Bay are similarly responsible for high levels of pollution
along the I-680 corridor in eastern Contra Costa and Alameda counties.
10variation in ozone pollution levels over time, much of which is due to a variety of
programs initiated after California passed its Clean Air Act of 1988. Following several
years of relatively low ozone pollution, the Bay Area experienced its worst year of
air quality for a decade in 1995. In 1996, the vehicle Buyback Program for cars
manufactured in 1975 or before was implemented, and this program contributed to
the summer of 1997 being the cleanest season since the early 1960’s.19 While 1998
saw considerably more ozone pollution, the remaining years of our sample returned to
relatively low levels. There is no reason to expect that any of these programs would
have had special economic consequences for housing prices in any speciﬁc part of the
Bay Area, aside from those operating through changing amenity values.
Data on violent crimes are taken from the RAND California data base.20 These
ﬁgures represent the number of “crimes against people, including homicide, forcible
rape, robbery, and aggravated assault” per 100,000 residents and are organized by city.
The data describe crime rates for 80 cities in the Bay Area between 1986 and 2008;
and we impute crime rates at the centroid of each neighborhood using a distance-
weighted average of the crime rate in each city. We focus our attention on violent (as
opposed to property) crimes as they are likely to be less subject to reporting error
(see Gibbons (2004)). With that in mind, it is possible that our measure of crime
will, to some extent, proxy for other sorts of crimes as well.
Crime rates in the Bay Area (and in many other parts of the US) fell dramati-
cally over the course of the 1990’s. In the Bay Area, this is particularly evident in
communities starting out with very high rates of violent crime (e.g., East Palo Alto),
whereas low crime areas (e.g., Palo Alto) saw virtually no change in crime rates over
the decade. In general, however, local crime rates have tended to ﬂuctuate in the
short run (annually), and even over longer periods.
The time-series variation in amenities just described may give rise to biases in
static demand estimation, anticipating the application in Section 6. Both ground-level
19Also relevant were the Lawn Mower Buyback and Clean Air Plan of 1997.
20http://ca.rand.org/stats/community/crimerate.html
11ozone and crime vary a great deal from year-to-year and mean-revert over very short
time horizons. Neighborhood racial composition, in contrast, is positively persistent,
with any change in composition today likely to persist into the future. If households
anticipate either the mean reversion or the persistence, their responses will reﬂect not
only the current change but also those expectations; and as a result, we would expect
a static model to return biased estimates when valuing these amenities. Regressions
exploring the time-series patterns of each (dis)amenity are shown in Table A.3 in the
Appendix.
















The precision of our model depends critically on the fact that rates of change in
amenities and house prices are not uniform across neighborhoods. To illustrate the
variation in the evolution of prices across regions of the Bay Area, Figure 1 shows real
house price appreciation by neighborhood from 1994 to 2004. The estimated price
12levels are derived separately for each neighborhood using a repeat sales analysis in
which the log of the sales price (in 2000 dollars) is regressed on a set of year ﬁxed
e ects as well as house ﬁxed e ects. The ﬁgure makes clear the signiﬁcant di erences
across neighborhoods in real house price growth over this time period.21
3 A Dynamic Model of Neighborhood Choice
Previous research modeling the process of household sorting across neighborhoods has
generally assumed a static environment.22 In developing a dynamic sorting model, we
introduce the dynamics of the neighborhood choice problem through two channels:
wealth accumulation and moving costs. Households have expectations about the
appreciation of housing prices and may rationally choose a neighborhood that o ers
lower current period utility in return for the increase in wealth associated with house
price appreciation in that neighborhood. Moving costs are the other component of
the neighborhood choice problem that induce forward-looking behavior. Because
households typically pay six percent of the value of their house in real estate agent
fees, in addition to the non-ﬁnancial costs of moving, it is prohibitively costly to re-
optimize every period. As a result, households will naturally consider expectations
about future utility streams when deciding where to live, making trade-o s between
current and future neighborhood attributes and therefore choosing neighborhoods
based in part on demographic or economic trends.
The model we present is one of homeowner behavior.23 Households are treated as
making a sequence of location decisions that maximize the discounted sum of expected
21Omitted neighborhoods in the study area are shaded white, as are the bordering counties.
22See Epple and Sieg (1999), Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), Bajari and Kahn (2005),
Ferreyra (2007), and Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2011) for several recent examples. Three
exceptions are Kennan and Walker (2011) and Bishop (2007), who analyze interregional migration
in the US in a dynamic context, and Murphy (2007), who examines the role of dynamic behavior in
the supply of new housing.
23We do not explicitly model the decision whether to rent or to own. We do, however, include
an outside option that includes moving from home ownership in the Bay Area to either a rental
property or a home outside the Bay Area.
13per-period utilities: formulated in a familiar dynamic programming setup, a Bellman
equation captures the determinants of the optimal choice.
In each period, every household chooses whether or not to move. If a household
moves, it incurs a moving cost and then chooses the neighborhood that yields the
highest expected lifetime utility. The decision variable, di,t, denotes both of the
choices made by household i in period t, namely (i) the decision of whether or not to
move and (ii) the decision of where to move, if the household has decided to move.
If a household decides to move, we denote that decision by di,t = j  {0,1,...,J},
where j indexes neighborhoods, J denotes the total number of neighborhoods in the
Bay Area and 0 denotes the outside option. If a household decides not to move, we
denote this decision by di,t = J + 1.24
The observed state variables at time t are Xj,t, Zi,t, and hi,t. Xj,t is a vector
of characteristics of the di erent neighborhoods that a ect the per-period utility a
household may receive from living in neighborhood j  {0,1,...,J}. For example,
Xj,t may include variables such as the price of housing and the quality of local at-
tributes such as air quality, crime, or the neighborhood’s racial composition. Zi,t is a
vector of characteristics of each household that potentially determine the per-period
utility from living in a particular neighborhood, as well as the costs associated with
moving. This vector may include such variables as income, wealth, or race. And
hi,t  {0,1,...,J} denotes the neighborhood chosen in t   1, including the outside
option.
In addition to the decision variable, di,t, and the observable variables, Xj,t, Zi,t,
and hi,t, there are two unobservable variables,  j,t, and  i,j,t. Of these,  j,t represents
unobserved neighborhood quality,25 and  i,j,t is an idiosyncratic stochastic shock that
24The number of choice options is therefore J+2. For a household who lived in neighborhood j in
t   1, we distinguish between the choices of not moving (di,t = J + 1) and of moving to a di erent
house within neighborhood j (di,t = j), as there are a small number of observations for which
households make such within-neighborhood moves. To simplify notation, we do not use a separate
index for neighborhoods and choices. For choices j  {0,1,...,J}, the household is choosing to
move to neighborhood j. For choice j = J + 1, the household is choosing to not move and so to
remain in the current neighborhood, which is in {0,1,...,J}.
25We allow households to derive di erent levels of utility based on their observable demographic
14determines the utility a household receives from choosing option j  {0,1,...,J +1}
in period t.26 Let si,t denote the states Zi,t, Xt and  t, as well as any other information
set variables, such as lagged characteristics, that help predict future neighborhood or
household characteristics.
The primitives of the model are (u,MC,q, ). Taking these in turn, ui,j,t =
u(Xj,t, j,t,Z i,t, i,j,t) is the per-period utility function, excluding any moving costs,
that household i receives from living in neighborhood j. MCi,t = MC(Zi,t,X hi,t) is
the per-period moving cost function, which is only paid when a household moves. By
assumption, moving costs are not a function of where within the metropolitan area the
household moves to; however, they are assumed to be a function of the characteristics,
Xhi,t, of the neighborhood the household is leaving in order to capture the fact that
realtor fees are proportional to the value of the house one sells. The full ﬂow utility
function is given by uMC
i,j,t = ui,j,t   MCi,tI[j =J+1]. The transition probabilities of
the observables and unobservables are assumed to be Markovian and are given by
q = q(si,t+1,h i,t+1, i,t+1|si,t,h i,t, i,t,d i,t). Finally,   is the discount factor.
Each household is assumed to behave optimally in the sense that its actions are
taken to maximize lifetime expected utility. That is, the problem of the household is








MC(Xj,r, j,r,Z i,r, i,j,r,X di,r 1,r)
    si,t,h i,t, i,t,d i,t
 
(1)
The optimal decision rule is given by d , which under the Markov structure of
the problem is only a function of the state variables. That is, di,t = d 
i,t(si,t,h i,t, i,t).
When the sequence of decisions, {di,t}, is determined according to the optimal decision
rule, d , lifetime expected utility can be represented by the value function. We can
characteristics. In so doing, we di er from previous work, such as Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes
(1995), that forces all individuals to have the same preferences for the unobserved choice character-
istic.
26As the vector of idiosyncratic shocks contains J+2 elements, a household that moves but chooses
to reside in the same neighborhood would receive a di erent draw for   than if that household chose
not to move.
15break out the lifetime sum into the ﬂow utility at time t and the expected sum of
ﬂow utilities from time t+1 onwards. This allows us to use the Bellman equation to
express the value function at time t as the maximum of the sum of ﬂow utility at time
t and the discounted value function at time t+1. We assume that the problem has an
inﬁnite horizon, allowing us to drop the time subscripts on V , the value function:27
V (si,t,h i,t, i,t)=maxj{u
MC
i,j,t +  E
 
V (si,t+1,h i,t+1, i,t+1)
 
 si,t,h i,t, i,t,d i,t = j
 
} (2)
Under certain technical assumptions, equation (2) is a contraction mapping in V .
However, the di culty is that V is a function of both the observed and unobserved
state variables. Therefore, we make a series of assumptions similar to those in Rust
(1987) in order to simplify the model.
Assumption (AS): Additive Separability. We assume that the per-period utility
function, u, is additively separable in the idiosyncratic error term,  i,j,t. Thus we can




i,j,t = u(Xj,t, j,t,Z i,t)   MC(Zi,t,X hi,t)I[j =J+1] +  i,j,t (3)
Assumption (CI): Conditional Independence. We make the following assumptions
regarding the transition probabilities of the observed and unobserved states. The
idiosyncratic choice-speciﬁc error term,  i,j,t, is distributed i.i.d. Type 1 Extreme
value (with density q ). Additionally, we assume that conditional on si,t and di,t, the
errors  i,j,t have no predictive power regarding future states si,t+1 or hi,t+1. Based on
the structure of the model and the assumption about  i,j,t, it follows that, conditional
on si,t and di,t, the neighborhood chosen in the previous period, hi,t, has no predictive
power regarding any future states and that di,t is su cient to predict hi,t+1 perfectly.
27Assuming an inﬁnite horizon implies that Vt(si,t,h i,t, i,t)=V (si,t,h i,t, i,t) and
dt(si,t,h i,t, i,t)=d(si,t,h i,t, i,t).
16We can therefore express the transition density for the Markov process, q, as28
q(si,t+1,h i,t+1, i,t+1|si,t,h i,t, i,t,d i,t)=qs(si,t+1|si,t,d i,t)qh(hi,t+1|di,t)q ( i,t+1) (4)
This allows us to deﬁne the choice-speciﬁc value function, vMC
j (si,t,h i,t), as
v
MC
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Similarly to per-period utility, we break out the full choice-speciﬁc value function
into a component capturing the lifetime expected utility of choosing neighborhood
j ignoring moving costs and another component that involves moving costs. It is
worth noting that the component of lifetime utility that ignores moving costs is not
a function of hi,t, the neighborhood in which the household lives before making the
decision in period t. Thus
v
MC
j (si,t,h i,t)=vj(si,t)   MC(Zi,t,X di,t 1t)I[j =J+1] (6)









    




The estimation of the model primitives proceeds in four stages. In the ﬁrst stage, we
recover a normalized value of the non-moving cost component of lifetime expected
utility for each neighborhood, time period, and observable household type, where
28In the estimation section, we will outline in detail our assumptions about the transitions of the
observable states.
17household type is characterized by race, income, and wealth. In the second stage, we
recover moving costs along with an estimate of the marginal value of wealth; the latter
allows us to link the normalized values recovered in the ﬁrst stage across households
with di erent wealth levels. We use a novel approach to estimate the marginal value of
wealth in this second stage, utilizing outside information relating to the ﬁnancial cost
of moving. In the third stage, we recover fully ﬂexible estimates of the per-period
utility. And, with estimates of the per-period utility function in hand, we regress
them on a set of observable attributes in the fourth stage. As will become clear, an
important feature of our estimation strategy is its low computational burden.
4.1 Estimation Stage One – Choice-Speciﬁc Value Function
Consider the problem faced by a household that has chosen to move. It will choose a
neighborhood which o ers the highest lifetime utility by maximizing over the set of
choice-speciﬁc value functions vMC. Conditional on moving, the moving cost term,
MC(Zi,t,d i,t 1), is assumed to be identical for all neighborhoods. As an additive
constant, it simply drops out and, conditional on moving, each household chooses j
to maximize vj(si,t)+ i,j,t, where vj(si,t) is given in (7).
We have assumed that the idiosyncratic error term,  i,j,t, is distributed i.i.d.,
Type 1 Extreme Value, which allows us to recover vj(si,t) in a number of ways.
Previous methods for estimating dynamic discrete choice models in the presence of
a large choice set are plagued by a curse of dimensionality. We therefore employ a
variant of Hotz and Miller (1993) based on the contraction mapping in Berry (1994),
which avoids this problem. Speciﬁcally, based on household characteristics such as
income, wealth, and race, we divide households into distinct types indexed by  .
Let v 
j,t = vj(si,t) when the characteristics (Zi,t) of the household i imply that the
household is of type  . v 
j,t is then a choice-speciﬁc value a household of type  
receives from choosing neighborhood j, ignoring any potential moving costs. Letting
u 
j,t denote the deterministic component of ﬂow utility for a household of type  , we
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   si,t,d i,t = j
 
(8)
We assume that agents use the state variables in s and the decision di,t to directly
predict future lifetime utilities, vj,t+1 and future types,  t+1. We discuss exactly how
they forecast in Section 4.3. Household i of type   chooses choice j if v 
j,t +  i,j,t >
v 
k,t+ i,k,t,   k  = j. Conditional upon moving (i.e., for di,t  = J+1), the probability of
any household of type   choosing neighborhood j in period t when  i,j,t is distributed














For any given time period, the vector of mean lifetime utilities, v 
t , is unique up
to an additive constant, thus requiring some normalization for each  . Therefore,
instead of recovering v 
j,t for every neighborhood and type, we recover ˜ v 
j,t, where
˜ v 
j,t = v 
j,t m 
t and m 
t is a normalizing constant, a portion of which will be estimated
later in the second step of our estimation procedure. Let ˆ P  
j,t denote the estimated
probability that households of type   choose neighborhood j in period t. We can then














As the number of types, M, grows large relative to the sample size, we may
face some small sample issues with observed shares. Therefore, instead of simply
calculating observed shares as the portion of households of a given type who live in
an area, we use a weighted measure to avoid zero shares. We do this to incorporate
the information from similar types when calculating shares for any particular type.
For example, if we want to calculate the share of households with an income of
19$50,000 choosing neighborhood j in period t, we would use some information about
the residential decisions of those earning $45,000 or $55,000 in that period. Naturally,
the weights will depend on how far away the other types are in type space. Denoting






i=1 I[di,t=j] · W  (Zi,t)
 N
i=1 W  (Zi,t)
(11)
where the weights are constructed as the product of K kernel weights, where K is
the dimension of Z. Each individual kernel weight is formed using a standard normal












We also want to include a lifetime utility term for an outside option. Our data
allow us to follow individuals through time, which means that we can calculate ˆ P  
0t,
the probability (in each year) that a seller does not buy in the Bay Area. On this
basis, the inside option shares are calculated as the share of those who are buying
(regardless of whether they were previously renting/owning/living in another city)
and who choose neighborhood j. The outside option shares are calculated as the
share of those who were owning in the Bay Area, sell, and then choose to not buy
another house in the Bay Area.30
We use this procedure in combination with the estimated probabilities of choosing
the inside options to obtain a normalized lifetime utility of choosing the outside
options for each type. We denote this lifetime utility as ˜ v 
0 and include it in the set
of alternatives used in estimating the move/stay decision.
29If W (Zi)=I[Zi=Z ], this results in the simple cells estimator for calculating
shares/probabilities.
30As there are fewer observations for households that we can follow over time, we do not estimate
the outside option shares separately for each year and type. Instead, we include a linear time trend
that is di erent for each type.
204.2 Estimation Stage Two – Moving Costs and the Marginal
Utility of Wealth
In a housing market context, households behave dynamically by taking into account
the e ect their current decision has on future utility ﬂows. In our model, the current
decision a ects future utility ﬂows through the two channels mentioned previously
– households are aware that they will incur a transaction cost by re-optimizing in
the future, and in addition, the decision where to live today a ects wealth in future.
Equation (8) shows how the current decision a ects both today’s ﬂow utility and
future utility. It also suggests that if v 
j,t (or ˜ v 
j,t) is known for all   and j, then
we can estimate moving costs based on households’ decisions to move or stay in a
particular period.
Given that we recover estimates of ˜ v 
j,t from the ﬁrst stage, we estimate moving
costs in stage two by considering the move/stay decisions of households in the fol-
lowing way: From the model outlined above, we know that in any given period, a
household will move if the lifetime expected utility of staying in their current neigh-
borhood is less than the lifetime expected utility of the best other alternative when
moving costs are factored in. We assume that moving costs, MC
 t
j,t, are made up
of two components: ﬁnancial costs, FMC(hi,t), and psychological costs, PMC(Zi,t).
The ﬁnancial moving costs are a function of previous location decisions, hi,t, as house-
holds pay ﬁnancial costs based primarily on the property they sell. The psychological
costs are a function of the observable characteristics, Zi,t, that deﬁne type  .
As the ﬁnancial moving costs reduce wealth, choosing to move changes a house-
hold’s type. For example, if moving costs are $10,000, then a given household with
$100,000 in wealth chooses where to live based on the utility of staying in their cur-
rent neighborhood with wealth of $100,000 and the highest alternative utility with a
wealth of $90,000. In practice, we treat ﬁnancial moving costs as observable and set
them equal to 6 percent of the value of housing in the neighborhood that a household
is leaving (i.e., FMC(hi,t)=0 .06 · Pricehi,t).
21If a household of type   moves, we denote their new type as ¯  , the new type
following a move reﬂecting the reduction in wealth by the amount of FMC.A
household will choose to stay (not move) if:
v
 
J+1,t +  i,J+1,t > maxk[v
¯  
k,t +  i,k,t]   PMC(Zi,t) (13)
However, from the ﬁrst stage we only recover the normalized choice-speciﬁc value
functions, ˜ v 
j, where ˜ v 
j = v 
j   m . We can then rewrite (13) as:
˜ v
 
J+1,t +  i,J+1,t > maxk[˜ v
¯  
k,t +  i,k,t]   (m
 
t   m
¯  
t)   PMC(Zi,t) (14)
The term (m 
t  m¯  
t) is unobserved but can be estimated as the di erence between the
value associated with being type   and the value associated with the reduced wealth
after paying ﬁnancial moving costs. In principle, we could estimate a separate term
for each combination of   and FMC; In parctice, we choose to parameterize it as a
function of Zi,t and FMCi,t, so:
m
 
t   m
¯  
t = FMCi,t 
 
fmc
where FMCi,t =0 .06 · Pricehi,t and   
fmc = Z 





Note that the stochastic terms are maxk =j[˜ v¯  
k,t + i,k,t], and  i,J+1,t.31 We estimate
(m 
t   m¯  
t) and PMCi,t from a likelihood function based on the probability of a












˜ v¯  
k,t FMCi,t  
fmc Z 
i,t pmc (15)
31It would be straightforward to also allow for a shock to moving costs, which would e ectively
allow all the idiosyncratic errors except  J+1 to be correlated.
22We then use equation (15) to form a likelihood equation consisting of every house-
hold’s move/stay decision in every period.32 Maximizing this likelihood yields esti-
mates of  fmc and  pmc.
The earlier (ﬁrst) stage of our estimation approach involved making a normal-
ization for each type of household, where ‘type’ could be deﬁned by personal char-
acteristics such as race, income, and wealth. Once we set the mean choice-speciﬁc
utility from having no wealth to zero, we only need to know these baseline di erences,
m 
t   m¯  
t, in order to recover the unnormalized choice-speciﬁc value functions.33 As
we can estimate the baseline di erences, we simply recover the true choice-speciﬁc
value functions as v 
j,t =˜ v 
j,t + m 
t.
It is important to recover these baseline di erences because they represent the
additional utility a household would receive from extra wealth, the marginal utility of
wealth being a key output of the estimation. Given that the choice of neighborhood
a ects future household type, the baseline di erences in utility across types represent
potential future utility gains from wealth accumulation. In addition, we will also use
the estimate of the marginal value of wealth from this second stage as a novel way to
deal with the endogeneity of house prices in the fourth stage.
4.3 Estimation Stage Three – Per-Period Utility
From stages one and two, we know the distribution of moving costs for each type, the
marginal value of changing type, and the true mean utility terms, v 
j. The next step
is to specify and estimate the relevant transition probabilities.
We assume that households use today’s states to directly predict future values of
the lifetime utilities, v, rather than predicting the values of the variables upon which
v depends. As potential future moving costs are a function of the price of housing in
32We assign each household a value, ˜ v 
j,t, based on which type they are closest to. Alternatively,
we could estimate equation (15) separately for each type using weights similar to those in Stage 1.
33We set the mean choice-speciﬁc utility from no wealth to zero for each year/income/race com-
bination. However, we are not imposing that these values are identically zero and e ectively undo
this temporary normalization through the use of year*type dummies in Stage 4.
23the neighborhood chosen in this period, households also need to predict how the price
of the house they currently occupy will transition. Further, as both moving costs and
lifetime utilities are determined by household type, households need to predict how
their types will change. The only determinant of type that changes endogenously
is wealth, so we assume that knowing how house prices transition is su cient for
knowing how wealth (and therefore type) will transition.34 We therefore only need to
model transition probabilities for v and price.
In theory, we could estimate the transition probabilities for lifetime utility sepa-
rately by type, as we have a time series for each type and neighborhood. However,
to increase the e ciency of our estimates, we impose some restrictions. Within each
type, we could assume that the neighborhood mean utilities, v 
j,t, evolve according to
an auto-regressive process, where some of the coe cients are common across neigh-
borhoods. In practice, we estimate transition probabilities separately for each type
but pool information over neighborhoods. To account for di erent means and trends,
we include a separate constant and time trend for each neighborhood’s choice-speciﬁc





















2,l +  
 
3,j t +  
 
j,t (16)
where the time-varying neighborhood attributes included in Xj,t are price, racial
composition (percentage white), pollution (the number of days that the ozone con-
centration exceeds the California state maximum threshold), and the violent crime
rate.35 Lagged value functions are also included as explanatory variables, implicitly
allowing the transition probabilities be a function of the unobserved neighborhood
attributes.
34With access to richer data on other forms of household wealth, the deﬁnition of wealth that we
use to deﬁne type could be expanded.
35For the outside option, we do not observe any attributes and estimate with only lags of the
choice-speciﬁc value function. That is, we estimate v 
0t =   
0,0 +
 L
l=1   
1,lv 
0t l +   
3,0 t + v 
0t.
24We also need to know how housing wealth transitions in order to specify transition
probabilities for types. We use sales data to construct price indexes for each type-
tract-year combination. Recalling that price is one of the variables in the neighbor-
hood characteristics X, we estimate transition probabilities for price levels according
to:





j,t l 2,l +  3,j t +  
 
j,t (17)
Given these transition probabilities, it is straightforward to estimate transition prob-
abilities for wealth and thus type,  . In both cases, we use two lags of the dependent
variable (v 
j,t or price 
j,t) as well as two lags of the other exogenous variables in X.
Knowing v, PMC, and the transition probabilities allows us to calculate mean
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   si,t,d i,t = j
 
(18)
where in practice, s includes all the variables on the right hand side of equations (16)
and (17) and   is set equal to 0.95.
For each type,  , neighborhood, j, and time, t, we now have the necessary in-
formation to simulate the expectation on the right hand side of (18). To do this,
we draw a large number of vt+1’s and pricet+1’s according to their estimated distri-
butions. Speciﬁcally, using r to index random draws, each vt+1(r) and pricet+1(r)
are generated by drawing from the empirical distribution of errors obtained when
estimating (16) and (17) and using the observed values of the current states. The
draws on pricet+1 are used to form  t+1 and MC
 t+1
j,t+1.36 For each draw, r, we can
then calculate a per-period ﬂow utility u 







36Once we draw a value for pricet+1, we can calculate wealtht+1 for someone living neighborhood
j as wealtht +( pricej,t+1   pricej,t) and MC
 t+1
j,t+1 as 6 percent of pricet+1.
37The total number of draws, R, is chosen to be large enough such that the simulated u 
j,t does
not change as R increases. In practice, setting R equal to 750 is su cient.
254.4 Estimation Stage Four – Decomposing Per-Period Utility
Once we recover the mean per-period ﬂow utilities, we can decompose them into
functions of the observable neighborhood characteristics, Xj,t. We treat   
j,t as an
error term in the following regression:
u
 
j,t =  
 
0 +  
 






x +  
 
j,t (19)
This decomposition of the mean ﬂow utilities is similar to Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes
(1995) or Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007), though in these models, the choice-
speciﬁc unobservable,  j,t, was treated as a vertical characteristic that a ected all
households’ utility in the same way. In our application, we allow households who are
di erent (based on observable demographic characteristics) to view the unobservable
component di erently, as in Timmins (2007) – hence the   superscript on   
j,t. The
time-varying characteristics used in our application are the user cost of housing,
ground-level ozone (measured in days exceeding the state standard), violent crime
(measured in incidents per 100,000 residents), and a measure of racial composition
(percentage white). In addition to neighborhood characteristics, we include controls
for type ( ), county (c), and year (t).
The user cost of owning a house is typically calculated as a percentage of house
value. Here, we calculate the neighborhood user cost as 5 percent of mean prices in the
neighborhood. User costs are, however, clearly endogenous. The traditional approach
to this problem makes use of instrumental variables. Our approach is di erent: we
use the marginal value of wealth estimated in Section 4.2 to recover the marginal
disutility of user costs. We assume that the e ect of a marginal change in wealth on
lifetime utility is the same as the e ect of a marginal change in income on one period’s
utility. In particular, the marginal utility of income (the negative of which can be
interpreted as the coe cient on user cost) is given by   
fmc. To decompose mean ﬂow
utilities, we therefore estimate the following regression, where     
fmc is known from
26Stage 2 and ˜ X denotes the non-user cost components of X:
u
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j,t (20)
In principle, we could decompose the ﬂow utilities separately for each type,  , as
written above. In practice, we constrain some coe cients to be the same across types
and estimate several di erent versions of equation (20).
5 Results
We can estimate the model separately for any given time-invariant observable house-
hold characteristic.38 The results we report here are based on estimating the model
for three income types – $40,000, $120,000, and $200,000 – and for whites only.39
In total, we have 75 types: 25 wealth types measured in $10,000 increments – $0 to
$240,000 – interacted with the three income types.
While there are four stages of estimation, the primary results of interest are the
marginal willingness to pay estimates recovered in the ﬁnal stage. Given our approach
to controlling for the endogeneity of user cost makes use of estimates of the marginal
utility of wealth, we also include a brief discussion of the Stage 2 results.
5.1 Moving Costs and the Marginal Utility of Wealth
We use the binary move/stay decision faced by each household in every period to
identify and estimate the psychological and ﬁnancial components of moving costs;
using the fact that ﬁnancial moving costs are 6 percent of the selling price allows us
to recover the marginal value of wealth also. The results of this estimation are given
38As a household’s wealth transitions endogenously, the estimation requires that we include many
categories of wealth.
39The process could be easily replicated for other racial groups, although small-number problems
may be more of an issue in the ﬁrst stage for other races. This could be addressed by pooling racial
groups, at least where researchers were not seeking to estimate the value of racial composition by
racial group.
27in Table 2. From the table, it is clear that the psychological costs of moving are large,
they decrease slightly in household income, and are falling over time.40









Constant*6% House Value 0.0323
(0.0012)
Income*6% House Value -0.00009
(0.000008)
Note: Income and House Value are measured in $1000’s.
The ﬁnancial cost estimates are of particular interest, given that they speak to the
marginal value of wealth. These estimates suggest that the marginal value of wealth
is positive but considerably lower for high-income types. The marginal per-period
utility of income coe cient that we take to the estimation of Stage 4 is given by
0.0323 - 0.00009*income. Our estimate of the marginal per-period utility of income
is decreasing in income, as expected, and is roughly half as small for households with
an income of $200,000 compared to those with an income of $40,000.
40The mean psychological costs are high are they represent the amount a household would pay to
avoid moving to a randomly chosen neighborhood in a randomly chosen time period. See Kennan
and Walker (2011) for an excellent discussion of the interpretation of moving costs in this class of
models.
285.2 Marginal Willingness to Pay for Neighborhood Attributes
In the process of decomposing the estimates of ﬂow utilities in the fourth stage, we
control for the endogeneity of user cost by estimating equation (20). We decompose
the ﬂow utilities in two ways. First, we pool the mean utilities for all types and
restrict the preference parameters for percentage white, violent crime, and ozone (as
well as the county and year e ects) to be same for all households. Later, we relax
these restrictions, estimating willingness to pay separately by income.
The raw coe cients resulting from this process are di cult to interpret by them-
selves. Therefore, to better understand the magnitude of the coe cients, we calculate
per-period willingness to pay for changes in each neighborhood characteristic. Per-
period marginal willingness to pay (in $1000’s) is given by   
x/  
fmc, which measures
how much a household would be willing to pay annually to receive a small change in
each of the amenities, holding expectations about future amenities constant.
Table 3 reports willingness-to-pay (WTP) measures for a 10-percent change in
each amenity across four di erent speciﬁcations, the WTP ﬁgures being given at the
means of percent white (69.34), violent crime rate (458.62), and ozone (2.19). As the
marginal utility of income,   
fmc, varies by income, we report the willingness to pay
measures for a household with income of $120,000, which is close to the mean.
Our preferred speciﬁcation is reported in column I. In this speciﬁcation, we exclude
the two highest and two lowest wealth categories and use a Least Absolute Deviations
(LAD) regression to limit the e ect of outliers. The results show that households with
income of $120,000 are willing to spend $1,558.20 per year to increase percentage
white by ten percent at the mean. The estimates are very precise.41 Analogously,
households with $120,000 in income are willing to pay -$585.56 for a ten-percent
increase in violent crime.42 For ozone, households are willing to pay -$295.60 for
41All the standard errors reported here and elsewhere in the paper were obtained using a bootstrap
procedure with 125 draws.
42This willingness to pay implies a value of a statistical case of violent crime (similar in construction
to the familiar value of a statistical life) of $1.2 million. This amount is consistent with other research
on the costs of crime (Linden and Rocko  (2008)) and is reasonable in magnitude (i.e., approximately
29a ten-percent increase in the number of days ozone exceeds the threshold.43 To
shed light on the robustness of these WTP estimates, we also estimate the model
using OLS instead of LAD in column II: the results there are quite similar, though
WTP for percent white increases somewhat. In columns III and IV, we estimate
the model without excluding the two highest and two lowest wealth categories using
LAD and OLS regressions, respectively. As can be seen from the table, the results
are reasonably similar to those in column I.
Table 3: Willingness to Pay for a 10-Percent Increase in Amenities
I II III IV
Percent White 1558.20 1952.87 1735.40 2270.88
(42.11) (52.78) (46.90) (61.37)
Violent Crime -585.56 -563.69 -603.82 -615.97
(15.82) (15.23) (16.32) (16.65)
Ozone -295.60 -329.31 -286.83 -319.76
(7.99) (8.90) (7.75) (8.64)
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimator LAD OLS LAD OLS
Wealth Outliers NO NO YES YES
As a supplement to the pooled estimates in Table 3, we also estimate the willingness-
to-pay measures separately for each of the three income types: $40,000, $120,000, and
$200,000. The results are presented in Table 4 and point to signiﬁcant heterogeneity
in willingness to pay for neighborhood amenities by income. For ease of exposition,
we only show results for our preferred speciﬁcation – i.e., using median regression and
excluding the extreme wealth types.
The implied income elasticities of demand for neighborhood race are substantial,
1
6
th the size of a typical VSL estimate).
43The corresponding willingness to pay ﬁgures for one-unit changes in the three amenities are:
$224.72 per year to increase percentage white by one percentage point, -$12.77 for one additional
violent crime per 100,000 residents, and -$1,349.77 for one extra day of ozone exceeding the threshold.
30with a ﬁve-fold increase in income raising WTP for percent white almost seven fold.
Similarly for crime, a ﬁve-fold increase in income is estimated to increase WTP slightly
more than four fold. In contrast, the implied income elasticities of demand for ozone
are much smaller, with a ﬁve fold increase in income only increasing WTP to avoid
ozone by 27 percent.44
Table 4: Willingness to Pay for a 10-Percent Increase in Amenities by Income
$40,000 $120,000 $200,000
Percent White 585.35 1342.87 3932.49
(18.36) (36.29) (207.86)
Violent Crime -327.38 -572.33 -1341.25
(10.27) (15.47) (70.89)
Ozone -274.62 -292.67 -347.79
(8.61) (7.91) (18.38)
6 Dynamic Versus Static Approaches
Equation (8) illustrates the problems associated with estimating a static model when
the true model is dynamic: in essence, specifying a static model creates an omitted
variables problem. In a dynamic setting, current neighborhood characteristics de-
termine the choice-speciﬁc value functions in two ways: (i) they a ect ﬂow utility
directly, and (ii) they help predict future neighborhood utility. Estimating a static
model omits the latter e ect.
The static model can be conveniently nested within our dynamic framework. The
former e ectively assumes that the household will always stay in the same location
and that attributes will never change; therefore, the location-speciﬁc value function
remains constant over time. As such, one interpretation of the static model is that
44These results are also robust to the alternative speciﬁcations shown in Table 3 – available from
the authors upon request.
31v 
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The speciﬁc way a given current characteristic predicts future utility will determine
whether the static estimator over- or under-predicts the e ect of that characteristic
on per-period utility. If higher values of a given characteristic predict improvements
in a neighborhood, then the marginal willingness to pay for that attribute will be
biased towards positive inﬁnity, which is the case for all three amenities we consider
(public safety, air quality, and neighborhood percent white).46
To set out the relevant intuition, it is useful to think about the current value of an
attribute predicting future values of that attribute, rather than future utilities. First
consider a disamenity, such as violent crime, that is mean-reverting: as in our data,
a high level of crime today predicts falling crime in future. In this case, we would
expect the static model to understate the disutility of crime. The argument is as
follows: households may be willing to pay quite large amounts to avoid high levels of
crime. However, when they see a neighborhood with high values of this disamenity,
they know that value is likely to fall in the future; and they are therefore willing to
pay much more for a house in that ‘bad’ neighborhood than they would be willing
to pay if the high value of the disamenity were permanent. The upshot is that the
estimated willingness to pay to avoid crime taken from a naive static model will tend
to be biased downward. The same type of argument applies similarly to air pollution
– in our data, ozone levels are also mean-reverting.
There are other neighborhood attributes that are persistent over time, such as
45This interpretation is equivalent to setting   = 0 while making the single-period price equal to
the user cost. The latter is consistent with the literature: no static models of the housing market
assume that the household pays the full sales price for one period’s utility.
46Given that our actual measures are for crime and pollution – disamenities rather than amenities
– a positive bias in the relevant coe cient means that the absolute e ect of crime and pollution
on utility will be biased downwards – i.e., the static results will suggest households have a weaker
distaste for those disamenities.
32racial composition. In contrast to ozone and crime, seeing a high percentage of whites
in a neighborhood today signals that the neighborhood is more likely to have an even
higher percentage white in the future. If these are attributes that households value
(and recall that we are only modeling the decisions of white households), they will be
willing to pay more for a house in such a neighborhood than they would if the high
value of the attribute were only temporary – in other words, persistent amenities are
likely to be worth more than ﬂeeting ones. A naive static model ignores this fact and
attributes all of the value to current preferences, thereby overstating the contribution
to ﬂow utility of high percentage white neighborhoods for white households.
To highlight the problems associated with ignoring forward-looking behavior, we
estimate a static version of our model for comparison purposes. Under the assumption
that agents are not forward-looking, a fraction of Stage 1 estimates (i.e., v 
j,t(1    ))
can be interpreted as ﬂow utilities. We can then decompose those ﬂow utilities by
running the same Stage 4 procedure used to decompose u 
j,t above. In particular,
we estimate equation (20), replacing u 
j,t with v 
j,t(1    ). The marginal utility of
income is recovered in Stage 2 and is still equal to   
fmc. By using the same marginal
utility of income coe cient as in our dynamic speciﬁcation, we keep the models as
comparable as possible and limit any bias to the coe cients on the amenities. Here,
even if the researcher were to incorrectly assume the model to be static, she would
control for the correlation between price and unobserved neighborhood attributes
using an Instrumental Variables approach. Yet if the true model is dynamic, the
chosen instrument will typically not be valid.47
Table 5 reports the marginal willingness to pay for a 10-percent change in each
amenity derived from the static version of the model when we pool all types and
47The problem with the IV strategy is that if the true model is actually dynamic, any static
instrument will be correlated with expected future utility, which is subsumed in the error term. In
particular, a condition that any potential instrument must satisfy is that it should be correlated with
the endogenous variable – in this case, price. Now, expected future utility is a function of all current
attributes. Therefore, unless current price has no predictive power with respect to future utility,
it will be impossible to ﬁnd an instrument that is both correlated with price but also uncorrelated
with expected future utility.
33evaluate at mean income. The dynamic results from Table 3 are also included for
ease of reference. As before, the marginal willingness to pay ﬁgures are reported at
the means of the amenity levels.
Table 5: Willingness to Pay for a 10-Percent Increase in Amenities – Static versus
Dynamic Estimates
Static Dynamic
Percent White 1973.79 1558.20
(53.34) (42.11)




The comparison of static and dynamic results in the table suggests that incorrectly
estimating a static model in a dynamic context can lead to very biased estimates.
The static model substantially overestimates willingness to pay for living in close
proximity to neighbors of the same race: the static estimate is $1,973.79 whereas
the corresponding dynamic estimate is $1,558.20. The biases for both crime and air
pollution, while also large in absolute terms, run in the opposite direction. The static
estimates for crime are -$343.63 in the static case and -$585.56 in the dynamic case
respectively for a 10-percent increase in violent crime, while for pollution, the static
estimates are -$73.25 versus -$295.60 in the dynamic case, again for a 10-percent
increase in ozone. In each case, the di erences are substantial and are precisely
estimated.
The signs of these biases are consistent with the discussion above – a high value of
each of the three amenities predicts improvements in the respective neighborhoods.
That is, the partial correlation between the three amenities and the omitted variable,
as deﬁned in equation (21), is positive, meaning that preferences for amenities will be
biased upwards and preferences for disamenities will be biased downwards in absolute
34value.
From a di erent angle, it is also interesting to see whether these biases can be
explained by patterns in the actual variables themselves. This is especially the case
as the omitted variable given by the equation is only known once the full structural
model has been estimated. We set out regressions exploring the time-series patterns
of each (dis)amenity in Table A.3 in the Appendix. For all three amenities, the time-
series patterns are consistent with the biases found: higher percent white this period
predicts larger increases (or smaller reductions) in percent white one period ahead,
and higher ozone and crime rates this period predict larger falls (or smaller increases)
in ozone and crime one period ahead.
It is worth emphasizing that the transition probability regressions shown in Table
A.3 were not used in our estimation routine; there, we used lagged attributes to predict
future value functions directly, rather than using them to predict future amenities.
As we do not use the time-series patterns of the amenities directly in our estimation,
we take conﬁdence from the fact that our empirical results are consistent with these
patterns.
Table 6: Willingness to Pay for a 10-Percent Increase in Amenities – Static versus
Dynamic Estimates by Income
Static Dynamic
$40,000 $120,000 $200,000 $40,000 $120,000 $200,000
Percent White 1787.62 2015.00 2551.79 585.35 1342.87 3932.49
(56.06) (54.45) (134.88) (18.36) (36.29) (207.86)
Violent Crime -268.57 -334.62 -475.81 -327.38 -572.33 -1341.25
(8.42) (9.04) (25.15) (10.27) (15.47) (70.89)
Ozone -68.70 -74.49 -92.24 -274.62 -292.67 -347.79
(2.15) (2.01) (4.88) (8.61) (7.91) (18.38)
In Table 6, we present results from an analysis of how willingness to pay varies
with income in the static model versus the dynamic model; again, we also include
the earlier dynamic estimates from Table 4 for comparison. The income elasticities
35implied by the static model are substantially smaller for both race and crime relative
to the elasticities from the dynamic model, apparent from the much steeper proﬁles
in the dynamic case; for ozone, the respective elasticities are fairly similar. The static
model biases are again broadly consistent with the above discussion, with the income
elasticities being considerably larger in the dynamic model, at least for race and crime.
For high-income households, the income elasticity of demand for race is su ciently
low in the static model that the sign of the bias for high income households changes
direction. All other biases have the same sign in the model where amenity preferences
vary by income type as in the pooled model.48
7 Conclusion
While models of residential sorting and hedonic equilibrium have a long history in
economics, almost all existing empirical studies based on these models have adopted
a static estimation approach. This is with good with reason: computational and
data issues have made the estimation of dynamic models extraordinarily di cult.
Yet location decisions are inherently dynamic, and this has led to concerns that the
estimates from static models may be seriously biased.
In this paper, we developed a tractable dynamic model of neighborhood choice
that controls for unobserved neighborhood heterogeneity, along with a computation-
ally straightforward semi-parametric estimation approach. Our neighborhood choice
model and estimator adapt dynamic demand models for durable and storable goods
for use in a housing market context, and build on this class of models in several
ways: (i) treating the house as an asset and allowing household wealth to evolve
endogenously, (ii) using stable, uniform realtor fees to estimate the marginal utility
of consumption without the need for a price instrument, and (iii) relaxing the strong
assumption about the evolution of the continuation value that is standard in the
48The patterns described in Tables 5 and 6 are also robust to the alternative speciﬁcations shown
in Table 3 – available on request.
36existing literature.
With our model and estimation approach in hand, we merged very rich trans-
actions data with publicly-available mortgage application data to create a data set
that matches the attributes of many buyers and sellers to homes. We then used
this dynamic data set to estimate household preferences in a manner consistent with
forward-looking behavior. In light of the concerns about bias when using static mod-
els, the estimates we obtained indicate that the biases associated with static demand
estimation are signiﬁcant for three important non-marketed amenities: air quality,
crime, and neighborhood race. Further, the signs of the biases we ﬁnd are consistent
with what one would expect, based on the time-series properties of each amenity.
Given the importance of accounting for such dynamic considerations when esti-
mating preferences for non-marketed goods, the model, data set, and estimation pro-
cedure presented in this paper have potentially broad applicability to the study of a
range of dynamic phenomena in housing markets and cities. These include examining
the microdynamics of residential segregation and gentriﬁcation within metropolitan
areas – applications we intend to pursue in related research using our approach.
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41Appendix
Table A.1: Comparison of Sample Statistics for Merged Data and IPUMS Data by
Bay Area County
ALAM C.C. MARIN S.F. S.M. S.C.
HMDA / Transactions Data
Median Income 83000 78000 121000 103000 108000 101000
Mean Income 98977 99141 166220 147019 137777 123138
Std Dev Income 96319 97928 176660 225646 123762 125138
IPUMS
Median Income 83400 76785 120000 100000 102400 100000
Mean Income 104167 99047 162322 137555 140447 124483
Std Dev Income 84823 83932 138329 121552 123451 99373
HMDA / Transactions Data
Percent White 49.85 68.27 90.65 59.12 60.08 49.07
Percent Asian 28.68 10.55 4.68 31.47 26.57 34.21
Percent Black 6.45 6.01 0.67 2.08 1.22 1.45
Percent Hispanic 11.76 12.38 2.51 5.86 9.90 12.27
IPUMS
Percent White 47.64 64.57 87.5 61.92 58.1 50
Percent Asian 27.34 11.37 3.3 23.37 25.41 33.51
Percent Black 7.77 6.05 2.3 2.8 1.24 1.16
Percent Hispanic 14.62 14.2 3.62 8.18 12.5 12.09
42Table A.2: Comparison of Sample Statistics for Transactions Data and Merged Data
Transactions Data
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Sale Price 1045920 354915 220886 16500 1521333
Lot Size 1045920 6857 11197 0 199940
Square Footage 1045920 1647 714 400 10000
Number Bedrooms 1045920 2.98 1.10 0 8
Number Rooms 1045920 6.73 2.00 1 18
Merged HMDA/Transactions Data
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Sale Price 804699 372240 212938 16513 1521204
Lot Size 804699 6730 10605 0 199940
Square Footage 804699 1649 687 400 10000
Number Bedrooms 804699 3.01 1.08 0 8
Number Rooms 804699 6.77 1.98 1 18
Table A.3: Time-Series Properties of Amenities
  Percent Whitet+1   Violent Crimet+1   Ozonet+1
Percent Whitet 0.0162 -0.3736 0.0097
(0.0002) (0.0138) (0.0003)
Violent Crimet 0.0010 -0.1605 -0.0010
(0.00001) (0.0010) (0.00002)
Ozonet -0.01185 -1.2256 -0.6578
(0.0014) (0.1034) (0.0021)
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Note: For the dependent variable,  Xt+1 = Xt+1   Xt.
43